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We  investigate  monthly  bilateral  exchange  rate  volatility  for  a  large  sample  of 
currency pairs over the period 1999-2006.  Pegs (particularly to the US dollar) and 
managed  floats  tend  to  have  lower  volatility  than  independent  floats.    A  deeper 
investigation  shows  that  the  peg  effect  operates  almost  entirely  through  currency 
networks (i.e. where two currencies are pegged to the same anchor currency), and the 
lower volatility of US dollar pegs reflects the size of the US dollar network.  Managed 
floats show clear evidence of tracking the US dollar, further increasing the effective 
size of the US dollar network. Inflation undermines the currency-stabilizing effect of 
peg networks. Currencies in smaller peg networks have higher unweighted but not 
trade-weighted  exchange  rate  volatility,  which  is  consistent  with  anchors  being 
chosen to minimize trade-weighted volatility.  The size of the effective US dollar 
network revealed here is a plausible explanation of the rarity of basket pegs. Volatility 
also reflects a range of structural factors such as country size, level of development, 
population density, inflation differentials and business cycle asymmetry. 
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1  Introduction 
In theoretical models,  an exchange rate peg generally has two effects: it removes 
monetary independence, so that the domestic price level is determined by the foreign 
price level; and it also reduces exchange rate uncertainty and flexibility, including the 
capacity to respond to shocks.  There has been extensive empirical research on both of 
these issues (e.g. Bleaney and Francisco, 2005, and Ghosh et al., 2002, for inflation; 
and Broda, 2004, and Edwards and Levy-Yeyati, 2005, for terms-of-trade shocks). 
 
This  paper  focuses  on  the  relationship  between  the  exchange  rate  regime  and 
exchange rate volatility, where “regime” is meant here in the broad sense of what 
anchor currency to choose for a peg (or to track in a managed float) as well as the 
degree  of  flexibility.    The  contribution  of  the  paper  is  that  these  issues  have  not 
previously been the subject of detailed study.   The paper addresses such questions as: 
(a) Are currency networks (currencies pegged to the same anchor) characterized 
by low internal bilateral exchange rate volatility, so that the effectiveness of a 
peg depends very much on the anchor chosen, as one would naturally expect? 
(b) Are currency network effects, if any, sensitive to certain conditions, such as 
the inflation rates of the countries concerned?  In other words, does monetary 
instability undermine the benefits of pegging? 
(c) Can we obtain any insight into the typical behaviour of managed floats, about 
which little is known?   Is there any evidence that they are quasi-pegs, and in 
particular quasi-pegs to the US dollar? 
 
Previous  research  has  established  that  pegging  reduces  exchange  rate  volatility, 
without yielding much insight into the questions above.  Flood and Rose (1995) show 2 
 
that real exchange rate volatility amongst the major currencies has been much greater 
in the post-1973 era of floating rates than under the Bretton Woods system, even 
though general macroeconomic volatility has not increased.  Klein and Shambaugh 
(2008)  demonstrate  that  since  1973  pegs  have  had  significantly  lower  bilateral 
volatility against the anchor currency, and also lower multilateral volatility, than non-
pegs, although there is a strong element of tautology in this result, since they classify 
the regime as a non-peg whenever the exchange rate moves outside a +/-2% band 
during  the  year  (unlike  the  IMF  classification  system,  which  allows  pegs  to  be 
devalued).  Bleaney and Francisco (2010) find that countries classified by the IMF as 
independent  floats  have  significantly  higher  real  effective  exchange  rate  volatility 
than all other regimes, including managed floats, after controlling for other factors.  
Meissner and Oomes (2009) investigate the determinants of anchor currency choice, 
and their results broadly support the interpretation that anchor currencies are chosen 
to minimize the transaction costs associated with exchange rate volatility. 
 
Other  research  has  focused  on  the  fact  that  some  currency  pairs  are  much  more 
volatile than others, whatever the exchange rate regime. Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1998)  show  that  optimum  currency  area  (OCA)  theory  helps  to  explain  bilateral 
exchange rate volatility amongst 21 industrial countries. Devereux and Lane (2003) 
use a much larger sample of countries and suggest that, after controlling for OCA 
factors, volatility is lower in countries with more external debt. Bravo-Ortega and di 
Giovanni (2005) find that country pairs which are more similar in the geographical 
origins of their imports have lower bilateral real exchange rate volatility, which they 
attribute to symmetry in the transmission of external shocks.  None of these studies of 3 
 
bilateral exchange rate volatility seriously examine exchange rate regime effects.
1  A 
further strand of research has concentrated on the negative relationship between trade 
openness and real effective exchange rate volatility (Bleaney, 2008; Bravo-Ortega and 
di Giovanni, 2006; Hau, 2002).   
 
For many purposes we are most interested in  effective exchange rates (nominal or 
real),  but these are aggregations of bilateral rates, and the weights differ across 
countries.  Specifically, a given bilateral rate tends to have more weight in the 
effective exchange rate of the smaller country.  Consequently, it is unc lear  what 
proportion of the cross-country variation in effective exchange rate volatilities derives 
from the underlying bilateral volatilities rather than from weighting differences.   The 
aggregation loses a lot of information.   In this paper, like Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1998) and  Devereux and Lane (2003), we avoid this problem by investigating  all 
possible pairs of bilateral volatilities, on the principle that, although the exchange rate 
between currencies A and B can be directly calculated from their rate against C, this is 
not true of volatilities, because the covariance term represents a degree of freedom .  
What is new in our study is a comprehensive analysis of regime effects, as well of 
structural and macroeconomic factors.  
 
The paper is structured as follows.  The empirical model is described in Section Two, 
and results are presented in Section Three. Section Four concludes. 
 
                                                 
1 Bravo-Ortega and di Giovanni (2005) include exchange rate regime effects in some regressions as a 
robustness test, and find them significant, but they do not examine them in any detail. 4 
 
2  The Model 
Several previous papers contain theoretical models that illustrate how exchange rate 
volatility  can  arise  from  price  stickiness  (e.g.  Hau,  2002)  or  local  technological 
shocks  (Bravo-Ortega  and  di  Giovanni,  2005).    The  theoretical  models  in  this 
literature tend to be described as “illustrative”
2 and do not provide precise guidance to 
the  structure  of  empirical  models,  which  follow  the  prototype  of  Bayoumi  and 
Eichengreen  (1998)  fairly  closely,  focusing  on  the  implications  of  OCA  theory. 
Rather than present a detailed theoretical model here, we give references to support 
the inclusion of the variables chosen in the empirical specification.  As in previous 
studies, our model assumes that the bilateral volatility of any pair of countries is a 
function  of  structural  factors  closely  informed  by  OCA  theory.  We  add  to  this  a 
detailed  analysis  of  currency  regime  effects.    We  estimate  the  following  cross-
sectional regression across all country pairs: 
 
  .. ij ij ij ij VLT CONTROLS REGIME                 (1) 
 
where  ij VLT  represents  a  measure  of  the  bilateral  volatility  of  currencies i  and  j; 
ij CONTROLS  is  a  vector  of  control  variables;  ij REGIME  is  a  vector  of  dummy 
variables for the exchange rate regime;  ij   is a random error term; and  ,   and   
are parameters to be estimated.  In detail the variables are as follows. 
 
 
                                                 
2 This actual word is frequently used (e.g. Bravo-Ortega and di Giovanni, 2005, 2006; Devereux and 
Lane, 2003). 5 
 
Volatility 
The  volatility  of  the  bilateral  exchange  rate  between  countries  i  and  j  ( ij Z )  is 
calculated as the standard deviation of changes in the logarithm of the end-of-month 
rate recorded in the IMF International Financial Statistics database over the period 
from January 1999 to December 2006:
3 
 
  ) ln ( ij ij Z d STDEV VLT                (2) 
 
Control variables 
We use a number of control variables that capture non-regime influences on bilateral 
exchange rate volatility. Except  where indicated, data are from  the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators database.  Full details of data sources are given in the 
Appendix. 
1)  Land area per capita is defined as the logarithm of the ratio of land area to 
population, averaged over the pair of economies i and j.  Where economies are 
less densely populated, they are more likely to specialize in primary products 
and are therefore more exposed to terms-of-trade shocks (Cashin et al., 2004). 
2)  Trade is the logarithm of one plus the ratio of bilateral trade between i and j to 
GDP, averaged over the pair of economies i and j.  Various theoretical and 
empirical  studies  have  indicated  that  it  is  correlated  with  exchange  rate 
volatility (Bergin et al., 2006; Bravo-Ortega and di Giovanni, 2005; Choudhri 
and Khan, 2005; Hau, 2002). 
                                                 
3 The start date coincides with the formation of the euro. 6 
 
3)  Cycle  asymmetry  is  the  standard  deviation  of  the  difference  between  the 
logarithmic  annual  GDP  growth  rates  of  countries  i  and  j  over  the  period 
1995-2005.  This is a measure of asymmetric shocks which is found to be 
positively  correlated  with  volatility  by  Devereux  and  Lane  (2003),  as  is 
predicted by optimum currency area theory. 
4)  Economic size is the logarithm of GDP in 2000, averaged over the pair of 
economies  i  and  j.    Larger  economies  tend  to  have  greater  exchange  rate 
volatility because there are more opportunities for internal trade (Devereux 
and Lane, 2003). 
5)  Inflation is clearly likely to be associated with greater exchange rate volatility, 
because of its effect on equilibrium nominal exchange rates.  Even if countries 
i and j have similar inflation rates, because higher inflation rates are more 
unstable, more exchange rate instability is to be expected in this case.  For this 
reason we include both the inflation average of the two countries i and j and 
the absolute value of the inflation differential between them.  Nevertheless 
inflation  has  been  neglected  in  previous  empirical  studies  of  bilateral 
volatility, although it has been shown to be a significant determinant of real 
effective exchange rate volatility (Bleaney and Francisco, 2010). Inflation for 
each country is the annual average percentage increase in the consumer price 
index over the years 1999-2006.  We did not find external debt and other 
financial variables, as used by Devereux and Lane (2003), to be significant, 
and they are omitted. 
6)  GDP per capita (in logarithms) is a standard control variable to capture the 
effect of different productivity levels; its sign may be positive or negative.  We 
also include dummy variables for the case where either or one of the two 7 
 
countries is an industrial economy, according to the IMF definition.  These 




We use two alternative systems for classifying exchange rate regimes.  One is the 
IMF’s official de facto classification system that has been in force since 1999.  Apart 
from  currency  unions,  this  identifies  seven  different  regimes  at  the  end  of  each 
quarter: independent floats (in which the exchange rate “is market-determined”, with 
intervention aimed only “at moderating the rate of change or the degree of fluctuation, 
rather than establishing a level”); managed floats (no specified exchange rate path or 
target, but with more intervention than would meet the criteria for an independent 
float); and five types of peg or band. A peg allows a fluctuation of ±1% vis-à-vis the 
anchor currency or currency basket, whereas a band permits wider fluctuations.  In 
crawling  pegs  or  bands,  the  central  rate  is  allowed  to  vary  according  to  a 
preannounced rule. We do not differentiate between these different types of peg or 
band,  including  currency  board  arrangements;  in  order  to  concentrate  on  the  big 
picture we classify them all simply as pegs.  It is important to note that occasional 




The alternative classification system that we use is that of Shambaugh (2004).  We 
apply Shambaugh’s identification of (actual or potential) anchor currencies to the IMF 
classification as well.  This classification is binary, with a regime defined either as a 
                                                 
4 We are grateful to Harald Anderson of the IMF for supplying the data set. 8 
 
peg or as a non-peg.  Classification as a peg in a given calendar year requires the 
difference  between  the  maximum  and  minimum  values  of  the  logarithm  of  the 
exchange rate against the anchor currency not to exceed 0.04 (or in other words a 
range of variation that does not exceed ±2%), with the single exception that a larger 
variation  is  permitted  in  a  single  month  if  the  eleven  other  monthly  changes  are 
precisely zero.  The resulting peg/non-peg classification is then applied to the entire 
calendar year.  Pegs are somewhat less frequent in the Shambaugh than in the IMF 
classification, but there exist observations which are pegs according to the IMF and 
non-pegs according to Shambaugh.
5 
 
The  regime  dummies  (peg,  managed  float  and  independent  float)  represent  the 
proportion of the time spent in each regime, averaged over the two countries.  For 
example, if country i was a peg for 20% of the time and a managed float 80% of the 
time, while country j was an independent float throughout, the peg dummy for this 
currency  pair  would  take  the  value  0.1,  the  managed  float  dummy  0.4  and  the 
independent float dummy 0.5.  We also subdivide the peg dummy by anchor currency. 
 
This specification assumes that the effect on volatility of both countries spending x% 
of the time in a given regime is twice that of one country spending x% of time in that 
regime.    In  the  case  where  peg  networks  are  important,  this  assumption  is  not 
justifiable;  the  currency-stabilizing  effects  probably  require  both  countries  to  be 
pegged to the same anchor.  We therefore construct two additional dummies designed 
                                                 
5 Other alternative regime classifications are those of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) and 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). The former has been criticized for treating big devaluations (e.g. of the 
CFA franc in 1994) as brief episodes of floating.  The latter is unusual in using parallel-market 
exchange rates; perhaps in part for this reason it is rather an outlier, with a low correlation with other 
classifications (see Bleaney and Francisco, 2007,  and Tavlas et al., 2008, for further discussion). 9 
 
to differentiate the cases of (a) country i pegging for 2x% of the time and country j 
0%, from (b) both countries pegging x% of the time.  Let the regime dummy for 
country i have the value Xi, and that for country j Xj.  The two new dummies are 
respectively: 
 
  ij i j B X X                    (3) 
  1 (1 )(1 ) ij i j E X X                   (4) 
 
For ij B  to be non-zero requires both Xi and Xj to be non-zero, whereas for  ij E  to be 
non-zero requires only one of Xi and Xj to be non-zero.  In the simplest case where Xi 
and Xj are integers,  ij B  will be one only if both Xi and Xj are one, whereas  ij E  will be 
one if either Xi or Xj is one.  For this reason we describe  ij B  as a “Both” dummy and 
ij E  as an “Either” dummy.  Note also that 
 
  ij ij i j B E X X                    (5) 
 
Thus the two new regime dummies sum to twice the original dummy, which was 
equal to ( )/ 2 ij XX  .  If  ij B  and  ij E  are entered together and emerge with similar 
coefficients, this is an indication that the original dummy was adequate.
6  If currency 
networks are important, then  ij B  should have a much larger coefficient than  ij E  for 
pegs to a particular anchor currency. 
                                                 
6 This is because in this case the implied effect of both being in the given regime, which is the sum of 
the  ij B  and  ij E coefficients, is approximately twice that of either being in that regime, as assumed in 




In  this  study  the  unit  of  observation  is  the  currency  rather  than  the  country,  so 
currency unions are treated as a single unit, with union-level variables calculated as 
either the sum or the GDP-weighted average of the constituent countries’ values, as 
appropriate. 
 
Episodes of high inflation 
The results that we present exclude all cases where inflation in one of the currency 
pair  exceeds  40%  annually.  The  regressions  are  in  fact  very  similar  if  these 
observations are included. 
 
3  Empirical Results 
Our data consist of 3415 bilateral exchange rate volatilities for 88 countries.  72% of 
the  observations  relate  to  pairs  of  developing  countries,  2%  to  pairs  of  industrial 
countries  (following  the  IMF  definition),  and  the  remaining  26%  involve  one 
industrial and one developing country.  The mean value of the peg dummy across the 
whole  sample  is  0.42  for  the  IMF  classification  and  0.31  for  the  Shambaugh 
classification.  The mean value of the managed float dummy in the IMF classification 
is 0.28.  Amongst pegs, 80% are US dollar pegs according to the IMF classification 
(75% according to the Shambaugh classification). 
 
Table  1  shows  our  first  results  that  include  control  variables  and  simple  regime 
dummies.    Bilateral  exchange  rate  volatility  is  positively  related  to  land  area  per 
capita, cycle asymmetry, economic size and inflation, with the average inflation rate 11 
 
being  considerably  more  important  than  the  inflation  differential,  and  negatively 
correlated with trade.  All of these variables are significant at the 1% level, and their 
signs are consistent with theory.  Volatility is lower if either currency is that of an 
industrial economy (and even more so if both are), but after allowing for this it is 
positively correlated with per capita GDP. 
 
In columns (1) and (2) the IMF regime classification is used.  Column (1) includes 
dummies  for  a  peg  (to  any  currency)  and  a  managed  float.    Both  have  highly 
significant  negative  coefficients,  so  there  is  a  strong  regime  effect.    These  two 
dummies are both zero only when both currencies are independent floats throughout 
1999-2006, which is the implied omitted category.  The column (1) estimates imply 
that volatility is lower by 0.0156 relative to the omitted category when both currencies 
are pegged, and by 0.0113 when both are managed floats.  In column (2) pegs to the 
US dollar (much the most common anchor currency) are separated from other pegs, 
and a dummy for the United States being one of the currency pair is also included.  It 
can  be  seen  that  the  estimated  reduction  in  volatility  is  much  greater  for  both 
currencies being pegged to the US dollar (–0.0123 – 0.0074) than for both being 
pegged to other currencies (–0.0074).  Quite probably this has nothing to do with the 
US dollar as such, but reflects the size of the US dollar peg network.  If a proportion x 
of currencies is pegged to a given anchor currency, then approximately a fraction x
2 of 
all bilateral rates consists of a pair each pegged to that anchor.  If the stabilizing effect 
of pegs derives largely from cases where both  currencies are pegged to the same 
currency,  then  this  quadratic  effect  means  that  pegs  to  commonly  chosen  anchor 
currencies will emerge with lower average volatility than pegs to more rarely chosen 
anchor currencies, other things being equal. 12 
 
 
In  columns  (3)  and  (4)  of  Table  1  we  repeat  the  exercise  with  the  Shambaugh 
classification.  In column (3) the estimated effect of pegging is significantly negative, 
but less than a third of the size of that for the IMF classification in column (1).  Since 
the Shambaugh classification is binary (peg/non-peg), the omitted category is both 
currencies being non-pegs, which would include many cases identified in the IMF 
classification as managed floats.  We show in Appendix Table A1 that, if we amend 
the regressions to have similar omitted categories, the estimated impact of pegging on 
volatility is similar for the two classifications.  In column (4) of Table 1 we separate 
out US dollar pegs from others.  The estimated additional reduction in volatility for 
US dollar pegs is highly significant and very similar to that estimated in column (2) 
using the IMF classification (0.0115 compared with 0.0123 in column (2)). 
 
 
   13 
 
Table 1.  Bilateral Exchange Rate Volatility Regressions with Simple Regime Dummies 
 
IMF Classification    JS Classification 
(1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
Land Area p.c. 
0.00321  0.00344    0.00362  0.00374 
(15.93)***  (17.65)***    (18.39)***  (19.40)*** 
Trade 
-0.07433  -0.02665    -0.07608  -0.02888 
(-4.51)***  (-2.67)***    (-4.63)***  (-2.90)*** 
Cycle Asymmetry 
0.1809  0.19211    0.19114  0.19855 
(17.62)***  (18.95)***    (19.22)***  (20.39)*** 
Size 
0.00071  0.00090    0.00115  0.00138 
(8.30)***  (10.99)***    (14.34)***  (17.62)*** 
Inflation Average 
0.00255  0.00260    0.00255  0.00261 
(22.92)***  (24.22)***    (21.26)***  (21.91)*** 
Inflation Differential 
0.00070  0.00072    0.00065  0.00062 
(9.41)***  (9.93)***    (8.09)***  (7.89)*** 
GDP pc 
0.00399  0.00387    0.00313  0.00277 
(15.15)***  (15.36)***    (12.56)***  (11.28)*** 
Peg 
-0.01562  -0.00738    -0.00434  0.00416 
(-15.57)***  (-6.83)***    (-5.40)***  (3.68)*** 
USD Peg    -0.01225      -0.01148 
  (-13.31)***      (-9.42)*** 
United States Dummy    -0.01416      -0.01485 
  (-10.99)***      -(11.13)*** 
Managed Float 
-0.01133  -0.01169       
(-10.30)***  (-10.89)***       
DEV. vs. IND Dummy 
-0.00568  -0.00566    -0.00195  -0.00163 
(-8.62)***  (-9.05)***    (-3.21)***  (-2.80)*** 
IND vs. IND Dummy 
-0.01571  -0.01584    -0.00829  -0.00784 
(-11.77)***  (-11.14)***    (-6.78)***  (-5.79)*** 
Constant 
-0.03258  -0.04077    -0.05486  -0.06325 
(-7.45)***  (-9.51)***    (-13.19)***  (-15.36)*** 
Obs.  3415  3415    3415  3415 
RMSE  0.0111  0.0106    0.0114  0.0111 
R^2  0.57  0.6    0.54  0.56 
Notes: The dependent variable is bilateral exchange rate volatility between all currency pairs, 
as described in equation (2). White heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are presented in the 
parentheses.  RMSE  is  the  root  mean  square  residual.  Asterisks,  ***,  **,  *,  denote  the 
significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Members of the same currency unions 
have been aggregated as single economies. High-inflation observations defined as >40% in 
any year during the sample period have been excluded. The United States Dummy takes the 
value of one if the US dollar is one of the two currencies. 
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Pegs to a common currency 
In  Table  2  we  investigate  further  by  relaxing  the  assumption  in  Table  1  that  the 
stabilizing effect of both currencies being pegged to the same anchor is twice as large 
as that of either currency being on a peg.  In column (1) of Table 2, we do this for the 
IMF classification without identifying anchor currencies, and simply separating “Both 
Pegs” from “Either Peg”.  The coefficient of Both Pegs (–0.0092) is about 40% larger 
than  the  coefficient  of  Either  Peg  (–0.0068),  which  is  suggestive  of  a  currency 
network effect; but of course many of the Both Pegs identified in column (1) are not 
pegs to the identical anchor currency.  Accordingly in column (2) we separate “Both 
USD-Pegs” and “Either USD-Peg” from pegs to other anchor currencies.  We also 
include  a  dummy  variable  for  the  United  States,  since  we  expect  that  currencies 
pegged to the US dollar will have particularly low volatility against that currency.  
The  first  point  to  note  about  the  column  (2)  results  is  that,  as  predicted  by  the 
currency network theory, Both USD-Pegs has a much larger coefficient (–0.01291) 
than Either USD-Peg (–0.00360).  This indicates that most of the USD-peg effect 
derives from cases where both currencies are pegged to the US dollar, which is much 
the most numerous case of currencies sharing a common anchor.  Indeed in column 
(2) the Both Peg coefficient is now smaller than the Either Peg coefficient, since so 
many of the cases of a common anchor have been “removed” from this category now 
that Both USD-Pegs have been separated out. 
 
Columns (3) and (4), in which the Shambaugh regime classification is used, paint a 
very similar picture. 
   15 
 
Table 2.  United States Dollar Peg Networks 
  IMF Peg Variables    JS Peg Variables 
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
Land Area p.c. 
0.00320  0.00344    0.00360  0.00373 
(15.90)***  (17.83)***    (18.36)***  (19.57)*** 
Trade 
-0.07525  -0.02591    -0.07617  -0.02663 
 (-4.51)***   (-2.53)***     (-4.59)***   (-2.64)*** 
Cycle Asymmetry 
0.18124  0.19112    0.1924  0.19891 
(17.67)***  (18.97)***    (19.37)***  (20.44)*** 
Size 
0.00071  0.00091    0.00115  0.00138 
(8.36)***  (11.08)***    (14.44)***  (17.74)*** 
Inflation Average 
0.00255  0.00259    0.00258  0.00263 
(22.89)***  (24.01)***    (21.44)***  (22.03)*** 
Inflation Differential 
0.00070  0.00073    0.00062  0.00060 
(9.35)***  (10.18)***    (7.70)***  (7.65)*** 
GDP pc 
0.00398  0.00384    0.00313  0.00274 
(15.11)***  (15.29)***    (12.58)***  (11.29)*** 
Both Pegs 
-0.00924  -0.00277    -0.00487  0.00330 
 (-11.83)***   (-3.73)***     (-5.02)***  (3.14)*** 
Either Peg 
-0.00677  -0.00428    -0.00097  0.00162 
 (-11.04)***   (-6.47)***     (-1.89)*  (2.47)** 
Both USD-Pegs    -0.01291      -0.01445 
   (-12.95)***       (-10.43)*** 
Either USD-Peg    -0.00360      -0.00346 
   (-6.84)***       (-5.24)*** 
United States Dummy    -0.01417      -0.01495 
   (-10.81)***       (-11.00)*** 
Managed Float 
-0.01129  -0.01169       
 (-10.28)***   (-10.89)***       
Dev vs. IND Dummy 
-0.0057  -0.00582    -0.00195  -0.0017 
 (-8.66)***   (-9.39)***     (-3.20)***   (-2.94)*** 
IND vs. IND Dummy 
-0.01544  -0.01523    -0.00816  -0.00735 
 (-11.62)***  -(10.70)***     (-6.68)***   (-5.44)*** 
Constant 
-0.03321  -0.04102    -0.0556  -0.06341 
 (-7.59)***   (-9.55)***     (-13.38)***   (-15.40)*** 
Obs.  3415  3415    3415  3415 
RMSE  0.0110  0.0105    0.0114  0.0110 
R^2  0.57  0.61    0.54  0.57 
Notes: The dependent variable is bilateral exchange rate volatility between all currency pairs, as 
described in equation (2). See Notes to Table 1. 16 
 
In Table 3 we refine our analysis of non-USD pegs further by identifying all cases 
where the two currencies are pegged to the same anchor currency.  In column (1), 
where the IMF classification is used, the coefficient of Both Same Non-USD Pegs (–
0.01819) is very similar to the sum of Both USD-Pegs (–0.01418) and Either USD-
Peg (–0.00438).  This shows that the estimated currency network effect is similar for 
both the US dollar and other anchor currencies.   Column (2) repeats this exercise for 
the Shambaugh classification.  In this case the estimated stabilizing effect of Both 
Same Non-USD Pegs (–0.02939) is rather larger than that of the sum of Both USD-
Pegs (–0.01618) and Either USD-Peg (–0.00419). 
 
A complication arises here with currencies that have switched exchange rate regime 
during the period.  If the stabilizing effect of exchange rate pegs operates through 
currency  networks,  then  it  requires  currencies  to  peg  simultaneously  to  the  same 
anchor.  If currencies A and B have been pegged to the US dollar for half the period, 
and (say) independently floating for the rest, the value of the Both USD-Pegs dummy 
will be 0.25 for this currency pair, whatever proportion of the period currencies A and 
B were pegged to the US dollar simultaneously (this proportion could be anything 
between zero and 50%).  Later we present a more refined measure of both currencies 
having the same anchor that takes this simultaneity factor into account. 
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Table 3. All Peg Networks 
 
(1)  IMF 
Classification    (2)  JS Classification 
Land Area p.c. 
0.00333    0.00364 
(17.38)***    (19.20)*** 
Trade 
-0.02143    -0.02070 
(-2.31)**    (-2.26)** 
Cycle Asymmetry 
0.19358    0.20070 
(19.46)***    (20.83)*** 
Size 
0.00096    0.00142 
(11.72)***    (18.18)*** 
Inflation Average 
0.00268    0.00272 
(24.95)***    (22.82)*** 
Inflation Differential 
0.00069    0.00055 
(9.55)***    (7.02)*** 
GDP pc 
0.00410    0.00296 
(16.29)***    (12.06)*** 
Both Pegs 
-0.00125    0.00515 
(-1.77)*    (5.38)*** 
Either Peg 
-0.00359    0.00248 
(-5.53)***    (3.89)*** 
Both USD-Pegs 
-0.01418    -0.01618 
(-14.42)***    (-12.13)*** 
Either USD-Peg 
-0.00438    -0.00419 
(-8.37)***    (-6.50)*** 
Both Same Non-USD Pegs 
-0.01819    -0.02939 
(-13.37)***    (-11.36)*** 
United States Dummy 
-0.01190    -0.01308 
(-8.35)***    (-9.24)*** 
Either USD-Peg  x 
United States Dummy 
-0.01104    -0.01262 
(-4.71)***    (-5.16)*** 
Euro Dummy 
-0.00730    -0.00633 
(-6.75)***    (-5.75)*** 
Managed Float 
-0.01173     
(-11.02)***     
Dev vs. IND Dummy 
-0.00535    -0.00123 
(-8.88)***    (-2.18)** 
IND vs. IND Dummy 
-0.01523    -0.00720 
(-11.76)***    (-5.81)*** 
Constant 
-0.04645    -0.06783 
(-10.67)***    (-16.12)*** 
Obs.  3415    3415 
RMSE  0.0103    0.0109 
R^2  0.62    0.58 
Notes: The dependent variable is bilateral exchange rate volatility between all currency pairs, as 
described in equation (2). See Notes to Table 1.  The Euro Dummies takes the value of one if the 
euro is one of the two currencies. 
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Inflation and peg network effects 
Anchor currencies tend to have low inflation rates.  Pegged currencies with significant 
inflation  can  be  expected  to  be  devalued  periodically,  whereas  those  without 
significant inflation may not be.  Because of this, the positive correlation of exchange 
rate volatility with inflation may be particularly strong for pegs.  This would imply 
that  the  currency-stabilizing  effects  of  pegs  to  a  common  anchor  might  be 
significantly eroded by inflation in the currencies concerned.  To investigate this, we 
introduce an interaction term between a dummy for pegs to the same anchor currency 
and inflation.  If inflation erodes the stabilizing effects of a common anchor, this 
interaction  term  should  have  a  significant  positive  coefficient.    To  simplify  the 
regression further, we replace most of the explanatory variables by double country 
fixed effects (i.e. fixed effects for both country i and country j), retaining only those 
where the variable’s value is specific to that country pair.
7 
 
Table 4 shows the results.  Trade and cycle asymmetry have significantly negative 
and positive coefficients respectively, as in earlier regressions.  Column (1) shows the 
results for the IMF classification.  The Both Same Pegs dummy has a coefficient of  –
0.01455,  which  represents  the  estimated  stabilizing  effect  of  a  common  anchor 
(relative to all other regimes) at zero inflation rates.  The interaction term of the Both 
Same Pegs dummy and average inflation has a significant coefficient of +0.00123, 
indicating  that  inflation  does  indeed  erode  the  currency-stabilizing  effects  of  a 
common  anchor.    Dividing  –0.01455  by  0.00123,  we  can  see  that  the  estimated 
                                                 
7 Variables that are constructed as averages of values for country i and country j, with the country i 
value the same for all pairs that involve country i, are collinear with the fixed effects.  This applies to 
all the regime variables except a dummy for pegging to the same anchor, and all the control variables 
except trade and cycle asymmetry. 19 
 
stabilizing effects are entirely eliminated once inflation averaged over the currency 
pair reaches about 12% per annum. 
 
In  column  (2)  of  Table  4,  the  same  regression  is  repeated  for  the  Shambaugh 
classification.  The results are fairly similar.  The Both Same Pegs dummy has a 
somewhat  larger  coefficient  (–0.0179),  but  so  also  does  the  interaction  term 
(+0.00193),  so  inflation  is  estimated  to  erode  the  stabilizing  effects  of  common 
anchors more quickly, reaching zero at an average inflation rate of about 9%.
8 
 
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 4, we repeat the analysis  with real (CPI-adjusted) 
exchange rate volatility.  The sample is slightly smaller because of the exclusion of a 
few countries that do not collect consumer price data monthly.  In this case the 
estimated currency-stabilizing effects of common anchors at zero inflation are about 
20% less than for nominal rates in either regime classification, and the interaction 
term is significantly positive once again. 
 
The results in Table 4 take account only of the average inflation of the currency pair 
and not of its differential.  In Table 5 we also interact the Both Same Pegs dummy 
with the inflation differential.  This has the expected positive coefficient, but the 
interaction term with average inflation continues to be significant.  It seems that both 
average inflation and the inflation differential have the effect of eroding the currency-
stabilizing effects of common anchors. 
   
                                                 
8 Since the identification of anchor currencies is the same for both classifications, the differences derive 
from disagreements about when currencies were pegged, not what currency they were pegged to. 20 
 
Table 4. Peg Networks and Inflation: Double Fixed Effect Regressions 
 
Nominal Exchange Rates 
 
Real Exchange Rates 
IMF Classification  JS Classification  IMF Classification JS Classification 
Trade 
-0.04479  -0.03975 
 
-0.04078  -0.03876 
(-4.17)***  (-3.64)*** 
 
(-4.37)***  (-4.24)*** 
Cycle Asymmetry 
0.06260  0.06268 
 
0.06844  0.06814 
(4.36)***  (4.39)*** 
 
(4.07)***  (4.04)*** 
Av’e Inflation x  
Both Same Pegs 
0.00123  0.00193 
 
0.00085  0.00190 
(7.75)***  (6.88)*** 
 
(3.30)***  (6.71)*** 
Both Same Pegs 
-0.01455  -0.01794 
 
-0.01205  -0.01444 
(-17.32)***  (-17.53)*** 
 
(-12.06)***  (-12.41)*** 
Obs.  3415  3415 
 
2943  2943 
RMSE  0.0043  0.0043 
 
0.0047  0.0048 
R^2  0.99  0.99 
 
0.99  0.99 
Notes: The dependent variable is bilateral exchange rate volatility between all currency pairs, as 
described  in  equation  (2).  See  Notes  to Table 1.   Dummies  for  both  currencies  i  and  j  are 
included in the regressions. 
 
 
Table 5. Double Fixed Effect Regressions Including Inflation Differentials 
 
Nominal Exchange Rates 
 
Real Exchange Rates 
IMF Classification  JS Classification  IMF Classification JS Classification 
Trade 
-0.04459  -0.03955 
 
-0.04030  -0.03787 
(-4.27)***  (-3.68)*** 
 
(-4.32)***  (-4.11)*** 
Cycle Asymmetry 
0.06334  0.06256 
 
0.06882  0.06866 
(4.49)***  (4.42)*** 
 
(4.09)***  (4.10)*** 
Av’e Inflation x 
 Both Same Pegs 
0.00046  0.00113 
 
0.00045  0.00103 
(1.73)*  (3.48)*** 
 
(1.81)*  (3.61)*** 
Inflation Differential x 
Both Same Pegs 
0.00064  0.00118 
 
0.00035  0.00150 
(4.22)***  (5.10)*** 
 
(1.21)  (4.94)*** 
Both Same Pegs 
-0.01467  -0.01974 
 
-0.01215  -0.01713 
(-17.89)***  (-18.41)*** 
 
(-11.74)***  (-13.03)*** 
Obs.  3415  3415 
 
2943  2943 
RMSE  0.0043  0.0043 
 
0.0047  0.0047 
R^2  0.99  0.99 
 
0.99  0.99 
Notes: The dependent variable is bilateral exchange rate volatility between all currency pairs, as 
described in equation (2). See Notes to Table 1.  Dummies for both currencies i and j are included 
in the regressions. 21 
 
 Managed floats 
It has been suggested that managed floats are so heavily managed that they are quasi-
pegs (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002).  Our results so far suggest that managed floats have 
considerably  less  exchange  rate  volatility  than  independent  floats.    A  further 
interesting question is: if managed floats are quasi-pegs, to what anchor currency?  In 
Table  6  we  include  dummies  for  every  possible  pair  of  regimes  in  the  IMF 
classification (the omitted category being both independent floats) to investigate this 
issue.  In this Table a variable described as “regime X with regime Y” is generated by 
the following formula: 
 
  i j j i ij X Y Y X XwithY   ) (               (6) 
 
This variable will be one if country i was in regime X 100% of the time and country j 
was in regime Y 100% of the time, or vice versa. 
 
The first column of Table 6 shows the results.  All regimes display significantly lower 
volatility than the omitted category of Both Independent Floats.  The lowest volatility 
is associated with Both USD-Pegs (–0.0215), but for Both Same Non-USD Pegs the 
estimated  coefficient  is  very  similar  (–0.0210).
9   This suggests that the effect on 
bilateral exchange rate volatility of pegging to a common anchor is similar across 
anchor currencies, as one might expect.   Managed Floats have much lower volatility 
with USD-Pegs (–0.0142) than with Non-USD Pegs (–0.0060),
10 for which volatility 
is greater than in the case of Both Managed Floats (–0.0095). 
                                                 
9 The two coefficients are not significantly different: F(1, 3393)=0.10 [p =0.75]. 
10 The difference is statistically significant: F(1, 3393) =80.0 [p < 0.0001]. 22 
 
 
The dummy for the United States has a significant negative coefficient of –0.0661, 
which indicates that all currencies tend to be more stable against the US dollar, after 
controlling for other factors.  As one would expect, this effect is particularly strong 
for USD-Pegs (the US dummy interacted with the USD Peg dummy has a coefficient 
of –0.01675), but it is also significant for Managed Floats (the US dummy interacted 
with  the  Managed  Float  dummy  has  a  significant  coefficient  of  –0.00986,  which 
represents  the  estimated  extra  stabilizing  effect  against  the  US  dollar  of  being  a 
managed float rather than an independent float or a non-USD peg). 
 
The  greater  stability  of  managed  floats  against  the  US  dollar,  and  against  other 
currencies that  are pegged to  the US  dollar, than against non-USD pegs  suggests 
strongly that managed floats tend to track the US dollar, and that in many cases they 
can be regarded effectively as members of the US dollar network.  This increases the 
effective size of the network and also the attractiveness of pegging or quasi-pegging 
to the US dollar, relative to other regimes. 
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Land Area p.c.  0.00344    0.00345 
(18.04)***    (18.05)*** 
Trade  -0.01926    -0.01912 
(-2.03)**    (-2.01)** 
Cycle Asymmetry  0.19119    0.19106 
(19.15)***    (19.15)*** 
Size  0.00092    0.00091 
(11.30)***    (11.28)*** 
Inflation Average  0.00260    0.00260 
(24.36)***    (24.29)*** 
Inflation Differential  0.00072    0.00072 
(10.02)***    (10.06)*** 
GDP pc  0.00384    0.00384 
(15.46)***    (15.45)*** 
Both USD Pegs  -0.02147    -0.02140 
(-16.83)***    (-16.81)*** 
Both Same Non-USD Pegs  -0.02101    -0.02106 
(-14.45)***    (-14.58)*** 
Pegs to Different Anchors  -0.00710    -0.00710 
(-6.62)***    (-6.65)*** 
USD Peg with 
 Managed Float 
-0.01416    -0.01439 
(-12.68)***    (-13.03)*** 
Non-USD Peg with 
 Managed Float 
-0.00595    -0.00616 
(-5.25)***    (-5.48)*** 
USD Peg with 
 Independent Float 
-0.00489    -0.00499 
(-5.11)***    (-5.28)*** 
Non-USD Peg 
 with Independent Float 
-0.00349    -0.00350 
(-3.31)***    (-3.37)*** 
Both Managed Floats  -0.00945    -0.00921 
(-7.01)***    (-6.84)*** 
Managed Float with 
 Independent Float 
-0.00372    -0.00384 
(-3.42)***    (-3.64)*** 
United States Dummy  -0.00676    -0.00680 
(-4.24)***    (-4.26)*** 
USD Peg x 
United States Dummy 
-0.01639    -0.01634 
(-6.44)***    (-6.41)*** 
Managed Float x 
United States Dummy 
-0.00946    -0.00937 
(-2.89)***    (-2.87)*** 
DEV. vs. IND Dummy  -0.00587    -0.00586 
(-9.55)***    (-9.54)*** 
IND vs. IND Dummy  -0.01511    -0.01516 
(-11.01)***    (-11.06)*** 
Constant  -0.04318    -0.04297 
(-9.99)***    (-9.95)*** 
Obs.  3415    3415 
RMSE  0.0103    0.0103 
R^2  0.62    0.62 
Notes: See Notes to Table 1. IMF regime classifications  are used. “Pegs to Different 
Anchors” = Both Pegs – Both USD Pegs – Both Same Non-USD Pegs. 
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As  mentioned  earlier,  the  “Both”  dummies  may  be  inaccurately  measured  where 
countries have switched regime during the sample period, since they take no account 
of how often currencies were simultaneously pegged to the same anchor.  In column 
(2) of Table 6, we repeat the regression of column (1) with a more accurate measure 
of  simultaneity.    Instead  of  taking  the  proportion  of  the  period  1999-2006  that 
currencies are in a given regime, and then multiplying these proportions, as shown in 
equation (3), we reverse the order and multiply the two regime dummies for countries 
i and j for each quarter, and then average those values.  In this second method, the 
“Both” dummy will reflect only the proportion of quarters in which currencies are 
simultaneously in the same regime.  Column (2) of Table 6 shows the results.  They 
are very similar indeed to column (1), so the potential inaccuracy of the approximated 
frequencies is not a concern in practice. 
 
Endogeneity issues 
There  is  a  potential  concern  that  some  of  the  explanatory  variables  may  be 
endogenous to volatility itself.  For example there has been considerable research on 
whether exchange rate volatility discourages trade (e.g. Clark et al., 2004), mostly 
with rather mixed results.  If volatility affects output, it could have an impact on the 
measure  of  cycle  asymmetry.  Although  these  concerns  are  almost  certainly 
exaggerated,
11 in Table 7 we show a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) version of the 
Table 6 regression, with trade and cycle asymmetry instrumented by variables such as 
distance,  dummies  for  a  common  language,  a  past  colonial  relationship  and 
landlockedness, etc. 
   
                                                 
11 The variation in trade flows across the sample is so vast that even a 10% reduction, say, in one 
country pair because of exchange rate volatility will have a negligible effect on the overall picture. 25 
 
Table7. Two-Stage Least Squares 





-0.13876   
Both USD Pegs 
-0.01783 
(-3.10)***    (-8.94)*** 
Cycle Asymmetry 
0.51850    Both Same  
Non-USD Pegs 
-0.01703 
(5.34)***    (-6.40)*** 
 
 




  (-1.27) 
Other Control Variables 
  USD Peg with  
Managed Float 
-0.01014 
  (-5.33)*** 
Land Area p.c. 
0.00300    Non-USD Peg with 
 Managed Float 
-0.00132 
(12.38)***    (-0.62) 
Size 
0.00147    USD Peg with  
Independent Float 
-0.00287 
(9.15)***    (-1.84)* 
Inflation Average 
0.00276    Non-USD Peg with 
 Independent Float 
-0.00028 
(19.27)***    (-0.14) 
Inflation Differential 
0.00016   
Both Managed Floats 
-0.00618 
(0.87)    (-3.13)*** 
GDP pc 
0.00406    Managed Float with 
 Independent Float 
-0.00155 
(12.93)***    (-0.87) 
DEV. vs. IND Dummy 
-0.00290   
United States Dummy 
-0.00474 
(-2.57)**    (-1.83)* 
IND vs. IND Dummy 
-0.00770    USD Peg x 
United States Dummy  
-0.01211 
(-2.99)***    (-3.74)*** 
Constant 
-0.08768    Managed Float x 
United States Dummy 
-0.00882 
(-7.43)***    (-2.07)** 
Obs.    3330 
R^2    0.45 
RMSE    0.0125 
Notes:  See  Notes  to  Table  1.  IMF  regime  classifications  are  used.  “Pegs  to  Different 
Anchors” = Both Pegs – Both USD Pegs – Both Same Non-USD Pegs. 
 
   26 
 
It can be seen from Table 7 that this does not change the picture with  respect to 
regime effects.  Pegs to the same anchor currency (the US dollar or otherwise) have 
the  lowest  volatility,  followed  by  USD  Pegs  against  Managed  Floats,  and  Both 
Managed Floats, as in Table 6. 
 
Basket pegs 
A few countries are classified by the IMF as basket pegs (see Appendix Table A2 for 
a list).   Hitherto we have treated these countries as pegged to the anchor identified by 
Shambaugh (2004) rather than as basket pegs.   In Table 8 we treat basket pegs as a 
separate category.  The new basket peg variables are jointly significant,
12 but their 
inclusion does not change the other coefficients to any significant degree.  Basket 
pegs display similar volatility against US Dollar Pegs (–0.00890) and Non-USD pegs 
(–0.01034).
13  They are more volatile against each other (–0.01383) than are Both US 
Dollar Pegs (–0.02415) or Both Same Non-USD Pegs (–0.02278), which is to be 
expected because the baskets used by different countries are not identical. 
   
                                                 
12 F(5, 3387) = 16.64 [p < 0.0001]. 
13 F(1, 3387) = 0.55 [p = 0.457]. 27 
 
Table 8. Basket Pegs as a Separate Category 
Control Variables 
Land Area p.c. 
0.00341    Trade  -0.01484 
(18.00)***   
  (-1.57) 
Size 
0.00100   
Cycle Asymmetry 
0.19040 
(12.13)***    (18.99)*** 
Inflation Average 
0.00265   
GDP pc 
0.00381 
(24.93)***    (15.40)*** 
Inflation Differential 
0.00073   
   
(10.19)***   
   
Regime Variables 
Both USD Pegs 
-0.02415   
Both Basket Pegs  
-0.01383 
(-18.50)***    (-6.86)*** 
Both Same Non-USD Pegs 
-0.02278    USD Peg with 
 Basket Pegs  
-0.00890 
(-12.48)***    (-6.96)*** 
Pegs to Different Anchors 
-0.00551    Non-USD Peg with 
 Basket Pegs 
-0.01034 
(-4.76)***    (-6.85)*** 
USD Peg with 
 Managed Float 
-0.01461    Managed Float with 
 Basket Pegs 
-0.00816 
(-12.77)***    (-6.01)*** 
Non-USD Peg with 
 Managed Float 
-0.00520    Independent Float with 
 Basket Pegs 
-0.00485 
(-4.30)***    (-3.98)*** 
USD Peg with 
 Independent Float 
-0.00476   
Both Managed Floats 
-0.00947 
(-4.86)***    (-7.01)*** 
Non-USD Peg with 
 Independent Float 
-0.00246    Managed Float with 
 Independent Float 
-0.00376 
(-2.13)**    (-3.46)*** 
 
United States Dummy 
-0.00680    Basket Pegs x 
United States Dummy 
-0.00273 
(-3.95)***    (-1.13) 
USD Peg x 
United States Dummy 
-0.01865    Managed Float x 
United States Dummy 
-0.00967 
(-7.11)***    (-2.87)*** 
 
IND vs. IND Dummy 
-0.00607   
   
(-9.90)***   
   
DEV vs. IND Dummy 
-0.01555   
   
(-11.28)***   
   
Constant 
-0.04759   
   
(-10.76)***   
   
Obs.    3415 
R^2    0.63 
RMSE    0.0102 
Notes:  See  Notes  to Table  1.  IMF  regime  classifications  are  used.  “Pegs  to  Different 





If countries choose an exchange rate regime other than an independent float, they 
presumably  do  so  with  the  intention  of  reducing  some  measure  of  multilateral 
exchange rate volatility.  We would expect that members of large peg networks would 
have  the  largest  unweighted  average  multilateral  volatility,  because  any  randomly 
chosen currency is more likely to be a member of the same peg network.  If countries 
choose their anchors to minimize trade-weighted exchange rate volatility, however, 
this network size effect should disappear: countries will choose a small peg network 
only if their trade is particularly weighted towards the members of this network, so 
their trade-weighted multilateral volatility would not necessarily be greater than that 
of members of large peg networks.  A peg network size effect that is apparent in 
unweighted  multilateral  volatility  but  not  in  trade-weighted  volatility  would  thus 
constitute indirect evidence that anchor currencies are indeed chosen by this criterion. 
 
Table  9  shows  the  results  of  regressing  unweighted  and  weighted  multilateral 
volatility for 97 currencies on regime dummies and control variables.
14  Unweighted 
volatility for currency i is measured as the log standard deviation over all months of 
the mean of bilateral monthly nominal exchange rate movements against all other 
currencies: 
 
    ln ( ( ln )) i j ij UMV STDEV MEAN d Z 
 
        (7) 
 
                                                 
14 There are a few more currencies than in the bilateral sample because some with less than complete 
trade data have been included. 29 
 
and trade-weighted volatility is the trade-weighted equivalent, where  ij w  represents 
the value of trade between currencies i and j in 2002, divided by currency i’s 2002 
trade with all currencies in the sample: 
 
ln ( ln ) i ij ij
j
WMV STDEV w d Z

 
              (8) 
 
The dummy for a peg is multiplied by the size of the peg network, which is equal to 
the number of participating countries minus the minimu m of two.  Thus the regime 
dummies are all equal to zero only for the  case of a peg network con sisting of only 
two countries. 
 
The  results  in  Table  9  show  that  multilateral  volatility  increases  with  inflation  and 
land area, and with economic size, but with  industrial countries having significantly 
lower volatility.  As predicted, unweighted volatility decreases with the size of the peg 
network,  in  both  the  IMF and Shambaugh classifications.  The managed float and 
independent float dummies (or the non-peg dummy) are not significant, indicating 
that these regimes have similar unweighted volatility to small peg networks.  With 
trade-weighted volatility, however, the picture is quite different.  The peg network 
effect  is  now  insignificant,  and  the  non-peg  regime  dummies  are  significantly 
positive.    This  suggests  that  countries  choose  their  anchors  to  minimize  trade-
weighted exchange rate volatility, and that they achieve greater exchange rate stability 
by doing so.   30 
 












Peg x Size of Pegging Network 
-0.00975  -0.00113 
 
-0.01422  -0.00462 
(-1.99)**  (-0.20) 
 
(-2.96)***  (-0.95) 
Managed Floats 
-0.1943  0.4038 
     
(-0.97)  (2.03)** 
     
Independent Floats 
0.1712  0.7736 
Non-Pegs 
-0.0685  0.4442 
(0.87)  (4.02)***  (-0.31)  (2.13)** 
Trade Weighted Distance 
-0.0410  0.0332 
 
0.0063  0.1042 
(-0.66)  (0.52) 
 
(0.11)  (1.42) 
Land Area p.c. 
0.0913  0.1365 
 
0.0916  0.1367 
(2.25)**  (2.90)*** 
 
(2.59)**  (3.50)*** 
GDP Size 
0.0407  0.0607 
 
0.0509  0.0765 
(1.58)  (1.88)* 
 
(2.11)**  (2.43)** 
Inflation 
0.0501  0.0535 
 
0.0445  0.0525 
(3.44)***  (3.24)*** 
 
(3.24)***  (3.40)*** 
IND Dummy 
-0.2653  -0.5123 
 
-0.1220  -0.3004 
(-1.76)*  (-3.17)*** 
 
(-0.79)  (-1.93)* 
Constant 
-4.302  -5.829 
 
-4.886  -6.756 
(-5.27)***  (-6.52)*** 
 
(-6.13)***  (-7.39)*** 
Obs.  97  97 
 
97  97 
RMSE  0.394  0.492 
 
0.387  0.501 
R^2  0.47  0.52 
 
0.48  0.50 
Note: The dependent variables are  UMV (unweighted volatility) and WMV (trade-weighted volatility) 
as given in equations (7) and (8) of the text.  “Size of Pegging Network” = number of countries in 
network  minus  two.  White  heteroscedasticity  robust  t-statistics  are  presented  in  the  parentheses. 
RMSE is the Root MSE of the regression. Asterisks, ***, **, *, denote the significance level at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively.  Members of the same currency unions  have been aggregated as single 
economies. High-inflation observations defined as >40% in any year during the sample period have 
been excluded. 
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Table 9 does not tell us whether the size of a peg network affects the choice of anchor.  
If it does, one would expect small peg networks to be preferred to large ones only if 
the  reasons  are  compelling.  Countries  would  peg  to  the  euro  (the  second  largest 
network) rather than the US dollar only if their trade with the Euro Area was very 
large relative to their trade with the US.  This seems to be the case.  In 2002 the 
countries pegged to the euro had total trade with the Euro Area that was 8.08 times 
larger than their trade with the US, whereas countries pegged to the US dollar had 
total trade with the US that was only 1.16 times their trade with the Euro Area. 
 
4  Conclusions 
Once we control  for  structural factors, whether and to  what  anchor a  currency is 
pegged matters for exchange rate volatility against other currencies.  The US dollar is 
much the most popular anchor currency, and currencies pegged to the US dollar have 
significantly lower volatility against each other than against currencies that are not 
pegged or that are pegged to other anchors.  This network effect applies to other 
currencies  as  well,  such  as  the  euro,  but  the  number  of  cases  is  much  smaller.  
Although membership of a small peg network implies higher volatility against any 
randomly  chosen  currency  than  does  membership  of  a  large  peg  network,  trade-
weighted (as opposed to unweighted) multilateral volatility does not fall with the size 
of the peg network.  This is consistent with the finding of Meissner and Oomes (2009) 
that countries tend to choose anchors on the basis of the volume of trade with that 
currency  network.  The  peg  network  effect  is  apparent  in  the  very  high  ratio  of 
bilateral  trade  with  the  Euro  Area  relative  to  the  United  States  that  seems  to  be 
required to attract a currency into the euro network. 
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In addition to this, managed floats have lower volatility against the US dollar and 
currencies pegged to it than against independent floats or pegs to other currencies, 
which is consistent with the idea that floats are managed in part to enjoy the benefits 
of the US dollar currency network, by deliberately controlling the volatility of the US 
dollar exchange rate.  To a significant degree, the US dollar appears to act as a quasi-
anchor for managed floats, so the effective US dollar currency network is larger than 
appears at first sight. 
 
This currency network effect may help to explain the rarity of basket pegs.  A priori a 
basket peg  would appear to  be the optimal way  to  minimize the volatility of the 
effective  exchange  rate,  but  a  single-currency  peg  might  have  countervailing 
advantages, such as greater transparency.  If there is an anchor currency that is the 
centre of a large peg network, pegging to that currency will reduce volatility against 
many other currencies, and the stabilization gain from choosing a basket peg rather 
than a peg to that currency  will be correspondingly smaller.  Consequently fewer 
countries will choose a basket peg if there exists a large single-currency peg network 
as an alternative.  One can imagine multiple equilibria, in which either most pegs are 
basket pegs, or most pegs are to the same single currency.  The historical role of the 
US dollar as the universal anchor in the Bretton Woods system might explain why the 
single-currency equilibrium is the one that we observe.  This is of course relevant to 
the declining status of the US dollar, because it suggests that its role as the centre of a 
currency  network  may  well  survive  substantial  portfolio  diversification  of  foreign 
exchange reserves into other currencies. 
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If a  country has  a significant  inflation differential relative to  its  anchor currency, 
pegging is likely to require periodic parity adjustments.  We have shown that the 
stabilizing effects of currency networks are indeed undermined by inflation in the 
currencies concerned.  According to our results, once inflation averages 10% p.a. in 
the pair of countries, most of the stabilizing effects of currency networks are lost, 
particularly if the inflation rates in the two countries are unequal. 
 
Finally,  structural  factors  are  important  in  bilateral  exchange  rate  volatility.  If  on 
average  the  pair  of  countries  has:  low  population  density  (which  suggests  a 
specialization in natural resources); a large economic mass; little bilateral trade; more 
business cycle asymmetry; and higher and less equal inflation rates; then the exchange 
rate between these currencies will be more volatile. Volatility is also lower if one (or 
especially if both) of the countries is an advanced country. To a significant degree, 
therefore, a country has to live with the exchange rate volatility that it gets, although 
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Table  A1  shows  a  version  of  Table  1  with  the  regression  for  the  Shambaugh 
classification  amended  to  have  a  similar  omitted  regime  category  (independent 
floats) to that of the IMF classification.  The apparent anomaly that appeared in 
column (4) of Table 1 – that with the JS classification pegs other than to the US 
dollar seemed to have higher volatility than non-pegs, since the Peg dummy had a 
significant positive coefficient – has now disappeared.  In column (2) of Table A1 
the Peg dummy has a significant negative coefficient, as in column (1).  This is 
because pegs are now being compared to independent floats as defined in the IMF 
classification, and not to all non-pegs as defined in the JS classification. 
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Table A1.  Comparison between IMF and JS Classifications with Similar Reference Category 
  (1)  IMF    (2)  JS 
Land Area p.c. 
0.00344    0.00353 
(17.65)***    (17.57)*** 
Trade 
-0.02665    -0.02739 
(-2.67)***    (-2.77)*** 
Cycle Asymmetry 
0.19211    0.19487 
(18.95)***    (19.08)*** 
Size 
0.0009    0.00114 
(10.99)***    (13.55)*** 
Inflation Average 
0.0026    0.00270 
(24.22)***    (23.42)*** 
Inflation Differential 
0.00072    0.00063 
(9.93)***    (8.28)*** 
GDP pc 
0.00387    0.00308 
(15.36)***    (11.90)*** 
Peg 
-0.00738    -0.00560 
(-6.83)***    (-3.22)*** 
USD Peg 
-0.01225    -0.01148 
(-13.31)***    (-9.24)*** 
United States Dummy 
-0.01416    -0.01455 
(-10.99)***    (-11.18)*** 
 
  IMF Peg *(1 – JS Peg) 
  
-0.01236 
  (-10.22)*** 
Managed Floats 
-0.01169  IMF Managed Float * 
(1 – JS Peg) 
-0.00684 
(-10.89)***  (-6.68)*** 
DEV. vs. IND Dummy 
-0.00566    -0.00341 
(-9.05)***    (-5.67)*** 
IND vs. IND Dummy 
-0.01584    -0.01190 
(-11.14)***    (-8.57)*** 
Constant 
-0.04077    -0.04217 
(-9.51)***    (-8.94)*** 
Obs.  3415    3415 
RMSE  0.0106    0.0109 
R^2  0.60    0.58 
Notes: The dependent variable is bilateral exchange rate volatility between all currency pairs, 
as described in equation (2). White heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are presented in the 
parentheses.  RMSE  is  the  root  mean  square  residual.  Asterisks,  ***,  **,  *,  denote  the 
significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Members of the same currency unions have 
been aggregated as single economies. High-inflation observations defined as >40% in any year 
during the sample period have been excluded. The United States Dummy takes the value of 
one if the US dollar is one of the two currencies. 
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Table A2 gives information about the countries which were classified by the IMF for 
at least part of the 1999-2006 period as basket pegs. 
 







Regime in Previous 
 Classification 
Frequency in Previous 
 IMF_PEG Variable 
181  Malta  EURO  0.83  Conventional Peg  1 
616  Botswana  South Africa  0.83  Conventional Peg  1 
618  Burundi  United States  0.067  Conventional Peg  0.067 
672  Libya  United States  1  Conventional Peg  1 
686  Morocco  EURO  1  Conventional Peg  1 
718  Seychelles  United States  0.6  Conventional Peg  1 
819  Fiji  United States  1  Conventional Peg  1 
846  Vanuatu  United States  1  Conventional Peg  1 
862  Samoa  New Zealand  1  Conventional Peg  1 
“IMF_BP” shows the proportion of the period for which the country is classified as a basket peg. 
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Appendix Table A3. Data Sources 
Raw Data (in Bold fonts)    Database 
Nominal Bilateral 
Exchange Rates 
  IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
Monthly End of Period NC/USD Rates 
Bilateral Trade for 
Openness 
Multilateral Exchange Rates 
Trade Weighted Distance 
  IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 
GDP for Openness    World Bank World Development Indication (WDI) 
 Current value USD 
GDP for Cycle Asymmetry    (WDI) Constant 2000 USD 
Inflation for Inflation Variables    WDI 
Inflation for 
 Real Exchange Rates    IFS monthly CPI 
GDP pc    WDI Constant 2000 USD 
Land Area and Population for  
Land Area p.c.    WDI 
Instrument Variables for  
Logarithmic Distance 
Common Language Dummy 
Ever Colony Dummy 
Landlockness 
  Andrew Rose’s Website: 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/RecRes.htm 
JS Exchange Rate Regime 
Classification 
   Jay Shambaugh’s Website:   
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~jshambau 
IMF De Facto Exchange Rate 
Regime  Classification 
  IMF Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
Bilateral Distance for 
Trade Weighted Distance    CEPII’s distances measure: 
 http://www.cepii.fr/ 
 
 